Install the skill above, then run this in your AI tool:
/protect-mcp-setup <your description>
About
Cryptographic governance for every Claude Code tool call. Each invocation is
evaluated against a Cedar policy and produces an Ed25519-signed receipt that
anyone can verify offline.
Source
What gets added to your project
Preview every file this package writes on install before you run the command above.
Summary
Configure Cedar policy enforcement and Ed25519 signed receipts for Claude Code tool calls. Use when setting up projects that need cryptographic audit trails, policy-gated tool execution, or compliance-ready evidence of agent actions.
Skill instructions
protect-mcp — Policy Enforcement + Signed Receipts
Cryptographic governance for every Claude Code tool call. Each invocation is
evaluated against a Cedar policy and produces an Ed25519-signed receipt that
anyone can verify offline.
Overview
Claude Code runs powerful tools: Bash, Edit, Write, WebFetch. By default
there is no audit trail, no policy enforcement, and no way to prove what was
decided after the fact. protect-mcp closes all three gaps:
Cedar policies (AWS's open authorization engine) evaluate every tool call
before execution. Cedar deny is authoritative.
Ed25519 receipts record the name of each tool that ran, signed with
your key.
Offline verification via npx @veritasacta/verify. No server, no account,
no trust in the operator.
Problem
AI agents make decisions that affect money, safety, and rights. The Claude Code
session log records what happened, but the log is:
Mutable — anyone with access can edit it
Unsigned — there is no way to prove integrity
Operator-bound — verification requires trusting whoever holds the log
For compliance contexts (finance, healthcare, regulated research), this is not
sufficient. You need tamper-evident evidence that can be verified by third
parties without trusting you.
Solution
Add protect-mcp to your Claude Code project:
bash
# 1. Install the plugin (adds hooks + skill to your project)
claude plugin install wshobson/agents/protect-mcp
# 2. Create ./protect.cedar (see below). The plugin installs the hooks.# 3. Create the signing key once (protect-mcp 0.7.4 sign does not create it).# An existing key is never replaced. See references/receipt-format.md to rotate.if [ ! -e ./protect-mcp.key ]; then
d=$(mktemp -d) && npx protect-mcp@0.7.4 init --dir"$d" && mv"$d/keys/gateway.json" ./protect-mcp.key
fiecho"/protect-mcp.key" >> .gitignore
# 4. Use Claude Code normally. Every tool call is now policy-evaluated# and produces a signed receipt in ./receipts/
Hook Configuration
Installing the plugin adds both hooks from hooks/hooks.json. Each hook runs a
script bundled with the plugin:
Claude Code passes the hook event to the command as JSON on stdin and does not
set TOOL_NAME or TOOL_INPUT variables. evaluate.sh reads tool_name and
tool_input from that payload and passes them to protect-mcp as flags; sign.sh reads
tool_name only, because the 0.7.4 signer records nothing else. Set
PROTECT_MCP_POLICY, PROTECT_MCP_RECEIPTS, and PROTECT_MCP_KEY to change the
default paths. When the policy file is missing, the PreToolUse hook prints a
warning to stderr and allows the call.
What each hook does
PreToolUse — Runs BEFORE the tool executes. Evaluates the tool call against
your Cedar policy file. If Cedar returns deny, the hook exits with code 2 and
Claude Code blocks the tool call entirely.
PostToolUse runs AFTER the tool completes. It signs a receipt that names
the tool and appends it to ./receipts/receipts.jsonl. protect-mcp 0.7.4 does
not record the tool input or output.
Cedar Policy File
Create ./protect.cedar at the project root:
cedar
// Read-only tools: one rule can name several tools in `when`. Add WebFetch
// with your own URL rule.
permit (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource) when {
resource == Tool::"Read" || resource == Tool::"Glob" || resource == Tool::"Grep"
};
// Safe commands only; git limited to read subcommands
permit (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource == Tool::"Bash") when {
context has input && context.input has command &&
(context.input.command like "git status*" || context.input.command like "git diff*" ||
context.input.command like "git log*" || context.input.command like "git show*" ||
context.input.command like "npm*" || context.input.command like "ls*" ||
context.input.command like "cat*" || context.input.command like "echo*" ||
context.input.command like "pwd*" || context.input.command like "test*")
};
// No chaining (`&` also denies `2>&1`), `$` expansion, redirection (`>` or
// `<`, which covers `<(`), file output (`git diff --output`), or rm -rf
forbid (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource == Tool::"Bash") when {
context has input && context.input has command &&
(context.input.command like "*;*" || context.input.command like "*&*" ||
context.input.command like "*|*" || context.input.command like "*$*" ||
context.input.command like "*`*" || context.input.command like "*>*" ||
context.input.command like "*<*" || context.input.command like "*\n*" ||
context.input.command like "*--output*" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf*")
};
// Writes only inside the project (paths are absolute), never via `..`
permit (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource) when {
(resource == Tool::"Write" || resource == Tool::"Edit") &&
context has input && context.input has file_path &&
context.input.file_path like "/path/to/project/*"
};
forbid (principal, action == Action::"MCP::Tool::call", resource) when {
(resource == Tool::"Write" || resource == Tool::"Edit") &&
context has input && context.input has file_path &&
(context.input.file_path like "*/../*" || context.input.file_path like "*/..")
};
String matching is best-effort: like checks the raw string, not a
resolved path, and an npm* permit runs arbitrary code, so it is only as
safe as the project's scripts.
Verification
Verify every receipt against the public key in ./protect-mcp.key:
bash
PUB=$(node -p 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync("./protect-mcp.key")).publicKey')
npx @veritasacta/verify@0.9.2 --replay-chain ./receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PUB"# Exit 0 = every receipt verified# Exit 1 = a receipt failed (tampered, wrong key, or malformed line)# Exit 2 = the file could not be read
The plugin's slash commands do the same inside Claude Code. /verify-receipt
takes one receipt in its own file, e.g., from
tail -n 1 ./receipts/receipts.jsonl > receipt.json.
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AI assistant context
What this skill is for
@wshobson/protect-mcp-setup@1.0.0 is an AIPM skill package for All tools. Use it when a project needs the reusable AI behavior described as: Configure Cedar policy enforcement and Ed25519 signed receipts for Claude Code tool calls. Use when setting up projects that need cryptographic audit trails, policy-gated tool execution, or compliance-ready evidence of agent actions.
Run aipm add @wshobson/protect-mcp-setup@1.0.0 in a project that has AIPM initialized.
Supported tools
@wshobson/protect-mcp-setup@1.0.0 supports All tools.
Before installing
AIPM skills can add files to your project. Review the package name, target, description, license, and publisher before installing. Use a clean branch when trying a new skill.